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IN THE SUPRElVIE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JERRY K. LANIER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HAROLD D. PYNE and GIBBONS

& REED COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant-Respondent,
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Intervenor-Appellant.

Case No.
12918

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to determine whether or not
plaintiff, an injured employee, may be compensated
for attorney fees on monies recovered by plaintiff to
which intervenotr-appellant was subrogated.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court determined that plaintiff was
entitled to have an attorney's fee paid to his attorney
out of the money recovered for intervenor-appellant
as provided in Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section
35-1-62 (as amended Laws of 1971).
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this Court deny attor.
ney's fees to the plaintiff on monies recovered for
intervenor-appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Trial Court found that the agreement
tween plaintiff and his attorneys for a one-thiro
attorney's fee was reasonable, that costs were incurred in the perfection of plaintiff's claim against the
defendant-respondent, and allocated the costs ana
attorney's fee in accordance with the proportionate
share of the total recovery.
There is no dispute that the mathematical calculations as to the proportionate share which inter·
venor-appellant should bear is correct. The CourL
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
ordered that the intervenor's share of the costs wa1
$86.83 and its share of the attorney's fee
$1,071.92, and that the net share to be paid Libertv
Mutual Insurance Company was $2,142.27.
The sole issue remaining is whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to have this paid by LibertY
Mutual Insurance Company or must pay the attor·
ney's fee out of his share and reimburse Liberti
Mutual Insurance Company for all of the sums ao·
. I
vanced through the Workmen's Compensation c1a!DI·:
The law governing plaintiff's rights to requin
2

intervenor to share in the costs of recovery reads as
foll0:ws:
The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of
costs and attorney's fees provided for in subsection (1) ." Utah Code Annotated 1953
Section 35-1-62, as amended by the Laws of
1971.

"(2)

The Trial Court records reveal that the Complaint was filed on November 30, 1970, Case No.
196665 CR. 1). Subsequent pleadings were filed and
interrogatories and other procedural matters covered
by the lawyers representing the plaintiff, as well as
lawyers representing the defendant, Harold D. Pyne
and Gibbons & Reed Company, a corporation. The
matter was set for trial on Wednesday, January 26,
1972, before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson CR.
109).
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company entered an
Appearance of Record December 9, 1971 CR. 45). The
Appearance of Record states that said insurance company adopts all of the pleadings filed on behalf of
plaintiff. On January 25, 1972, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company filed an Amended Appearance of
Record ( R. 49) . Again it adopted the pleadings of
plaintiff and set down in particular the expenditures
made through Workmen's Compensation on behalf
of the plaintiff to which subrogated. On the 26th of
January a settlement was negotiated between plaintiff's counsel and the lawyers appearing for defendant.
3

A discussion occurred between the attorney,
the defendant, those
Liberty Mutual, and the attorneys representing thr
plaintiff as to how the settlement monies could bi
paid and disbursed ( R. 113-114) . As a result of the
disagreement between the lawyers representing intervenor and the lawyers representing plaintiff, the
Court struck the trial setting and extended counsel
an opportunity to work out the details and procedure
of the settlement (R. 123). On January 27, 1972
plaintiff filed a Petition with the Court requesting
that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's share of
costs and attorney's fees be determined (R. 54-56J.
No answer to the Petition was ever filed. The Petition
was set for hearing on the 8th of February. Plaintiff
filed its affidavit of costs and expenses (R. 61-62), and
again there was no denial of the affidavit showing
costs and disbursements. Liberty Mutual appeared
by and through its attorneys, plaintiff appeared, and
the Court made the Order from which Liberty Mutual
appealed to this Court (R. 63-64). Intervenor ob·
jected to the Order, required that Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law be made, and these were
subsequently ordered by the Court and prepared
by counsel for plaintiff (R. 76-79). Intervenor ob·
jected to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and moved for a new trial ( R. 82-83). These objections and motion were heard and denied (R. 93).
On the 18th of February, 1972, intervenor and
plaintiff's attorneys stipulated that the difference
between the total settlement and the amount in which
4

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company had an interest

could bc released to the plaintiff and the balance held
pending the outcome of the dispute between plaintiff
and intervenor CR. 70-71).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INTERVENOR VOLUNTARILY APPEARED TO
PROTECT ITS SUBROGATION RIGHTS.
Under Point I of its Brief, intervenor objects to
the Court's determination of plaintiff's rights to the

pro-rata share of costs and attorney's fees. Its position
is completely inconsistent with its conduct on the
trial level.
Without any necessity, it appeared, no one
denied its rights to repayment under Section 35-1-62,
UC/1. Defendant stipulated with it as to the amount
lR. 51-52). Plaintiff's petition accepts the exact
amount as having been paid out (R. 54).
The only purpose it would seem for the Appearance of Record CR. 45) and Amended Appearance of
Record ( R. 49) was to submit intervenor's right to
the Trial Court to have its full payment returned out
of the amount plaintiff obtained from defendant.
Plaintiff's petition then presents the facts relating to such rights claimed by intervenor (R. 54-5556).

Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure gives
5

intervenor its right to intervene. It states:
"(a)_ Intervention of Right. Upon timely appli.
shall be permitted to intervene
an .action: * * * (3) when the applicant
is. so. situated as to be adversely affected by a
or other disposition of property
which ism the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer
thereof."
While intervenor calls its filing an "Appearance," it really amounts to an intervention to which
no other party objected.
Plaintiff might have called its petition a
"motion" or "claim," but it does conform to Rule 8
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and when considered
with intervenor's "Appearance," presents for a Court
an issue to be decided and which was decided after
all parties had their day in court.

It is submitted that the procedure followed wa1
0
proper and was calculated to present the issues to the: r
Court in a manner designed to arrive at a just result.

ll

ti

POINT II
I
ALL ISSUES WERE EITHER ADMITIED ORI
SUPPORTED WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVl· 1 F
DENCE.
h,
I

The petition filed by plaintiff set forth the basic! th
affirmative factual allegations on which plaintiff:
ca
claims relief. It set forth a demand for relief. II:
complies with Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-;
cedure in every respect. It is submitted that t he fac11 \\'i
1
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that it is called a "petition" rather than a "motion"
or "complaint" should be considered immaterial as
no party was in any way prejudiced by the title.
Intervenor did not deny the allegations of the
petition nor could it reasonably do so. An affidavit
was filed, sworn to by Attorney Hunt, setting forth
the costs actually incurred in preparation for trial
m. 60. No counter affidavit was filed. Under Rule
8(d), U.R.C.P., averments in a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is required, other than those as to
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied
in the responsive pleading. Intervenor filed objections to the Order and Findings and Conclusions and
moved for a new trial, but did not deny the essential
facts which the Court based its judgment upon.

ei

R

I·
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The Trial Court was also in possession of all the
evidence necessary to pass on the amount of attorney's fee. The file was in its possession, the affidavit
on costs expended was filed, the nature of the case was
revealed by the file, its difficulties and complications
in evidence. What other evidence would have probative value?
In Prettyman v. Utah State Department of
Finance, 27 Utah 2d 333, 496 P. 2d 89, this Court
handled a matter where the attorney's fee was
percent of the recovery. The Trial Court then knows
that such fees are not uncommon for personal injm:y
cases.
The basic evidence on which the Court could act
Was present, especially on an undisputed matter.
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POINT III
INTERVENOR'S INTERESTS ARE FULLY PRO.
TECTED BY PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT OF
COUNSEL TO BRING HIS BASIC ACTION. !
I

There is no possibility that a plaintiff would not I
protect to the best of his ability the interest of the I
intervenor who is subrogated to a small portion ol !
the amount plaintiff seeks to recover for his injurie1.
I

Intervenor's Point IV and V have heretofore
been discussed in decisions of this Court and completely answered, and it is difficult to understand
why the intervenor would wish to require the Court
to reconsider the matter since it is so clearly covered
in prior decisions. In Worthen v. Shurtleff ami
Andrews, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P.2d 223, the
Department of Finance in the case was shown a1 I
intervenor and appellant, and their position was ex·
actly the position now argued by present intervenor
In discussing and disposing of the contention that the
intervenor had not employed counsel and its interest
would not be adequately protected, this Court stated:
"The defendant, The State Insurance Fund,
presents another point of argument which
deserves comment: That inasmuch as it did
not hire the plaintiff's attorney and is not a
party to the contract, to hold that it is bound
to that contract is to leave it at the mercy o!
parties over whom it has no control. That it
is not a party to the contract must be con·
ceded. But by the same token, it is not bound
thereby. Its obligation derives from the
statute requiring it to bear its share of 1
reasonable expenses of the action, including

'0

8

attorneys' fees.' And that is all it is chargeable with, regardless of what the other parties
may contract for. In the instant case the trial
court approved the one-fourth contingent fee
as reasonable."
In Point V the intervenor argues that the plaintiff's attorneys were on notice that the intervenor
would wish to participate in the legal action and protect its own interests, though intervenor did not file
any legal action nor take any activity whatsoever to
protect the interest of plaintiff. It quotes Section
35-1-62 U.C.A. U953) which provides that the employer or insurance carrier shall become Trustee of
the cause of action against the third party and may
bring and maintain the action either in its own name
or the name of the injured employee.
It is plaintiff's position that while the insurance
carrier may be his Trustee, he, as the Trustor and
beneficiary of the cause of action, would have the
basic and fundamental right to control any litigation
that might be commenced for and on his behalf.

In Worthen, supra, the Court further discussed
the equitable principles involved and resolved the
practical problem presented. It said:
"The basic purpose of this statute is that of
making an equitable arrangement between
an injured employee, and an insurer (or employer) who pays him workmen's compensation, with respect to a cause of action against
a third party who injures the employee. It
preserves the action to the employee, but it
prevents him from having double recovery
9

by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. 11
also gives the insurer the right to bring the
action, but allows it only tp reimburse itseli !
and then pay any balance to the employee.
I

Where each of the parties has the right to i
bring the action and one takes the initiative
and obtains a recovery for the benefit of both.
it is only fair that each bear his share of the
expenses necessarily incurred in doing so.
That this is the meaning intended in paragraph ( 1) seems unmistakably clear."
As a practical matter, in the cases where there
is industrial compensation payments, the employee
would not bring any kind of litigation against a third
party except where the chance of recovery exceed1
the amount that the compensated employee has
received. He would not commence litigation excepl
where it was economically beneficial to him. The
Trustee, if it is the insurance carrier, of course would
have no interest in obtaining a settlement or recovery
greater than the amount that it had paid out; as a
consequence, would not be an adequate representa·
tive of the employee.
The situation is a common one. Many times the
plaintiff in litigation will be required to repay med·
ical expenses advanced to him by his own insurance
and personal injury insurance carrier, and in these
instances the insurance carrier is subrogated to that
part of the recovery which is medical expenses for
which it has compensated the injured plaintiff. In
these cases there is no question but what the insurance
10
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carrier must pay its pro-rata share of the costs of
recovery, including the attorney's fees.
The litigation which has been handled by this
Court demonstrates the economic reality that the
injured employee always brings the claim against the
third party who has caused his injury. In none of the
cases has there been any attempt by the insurance
carrier or intervenor to commence the litigation
against the third party. This is probably due to the
fact that the insurance carrier is only interested in a
small portion of the plaintiff's claim. See the analysis
of economic issues set forth in this Court's latest
decision, Graham v. Industrial Commission, 26 Utah
Zd 424, 491 P.2d 223, on Rehearing 27 Utah 2d 279,
495 P.2d 806.
It would be a very strange situation where a
Trustee would not be subject to the direction of the
Trustor who is the principal beneficiary of the trust
which has been created. Plaintiff submits that this
would be true in the present kind of statutory trust.
Generally speaking then, where an injured employee believes that he has a claim against a third
party, he employs his own counsel and commences
an action to recover not only the amount advanced
to him by the insurance carrier as workmen's compensation, but additional sums to which he feels that
he is entitled as a result of the negligence of the third
party. No actual benefit can be obtained by the
injured employee under these circumstances until
after he has recovered sufficient to compensate the

11

insurance carrier. The motive for the injured em
ployee to recover that, plus something for himsell.
provides the protection for the insurance carrier
intervenor in this instance. The reverse is true when
the intervenor as Trustee attempts to handle th,
action. His sole interest is to obtain
for his out-of-pocket expenses. As soon as he has dont!
this, he would not have any motive in proceedino.t·
further with the action and recovering on behalf 011
the injured employee. All the benefits then would g11:
to the injured employee and the insurance carrier hail
no interest in that fund.
I
I

i

It is respectfully submitted that the most that/
can be said for the intervenor's activity is that it seek-!
either a full free ride or a partial free ride and feeli/
that it should dictate what the real party in interest
the plaintiff, does as far as recovering excess over hi,:
workman's compensation payments.

I

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Courti,
should affirm the Trial Court's decision and thatcost, 1
should be awarded the plaintiff, together with the/
interest on the unpaid portion of the recovery helal
to await this Court's decision and final outcome.
r

Respectfully submitted,
GAYLE DEAN HUNT
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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